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A NEW AGE OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS? 
Wayne Sandholtz* 
 
KAREN J. ALTER, THE NEW TERRAIN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: COURTS,  
POLITICS, RIGHTS (PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS 2014). PP. 480. 
PAPERBACK $ 35.00. 
In The New Terrain of International Law, Karen Alter argues that the international 
courts of today perform more roles and do so with greater effect on world politics than 
their predecessors did.1 In theorizing the roles of modern international courts and illustrat-
ing their effects on national and international law and policy, Alter has established a new 
plateau in scholarship on international courts, one upon which many others will surely 
build. 
Alter’s agenda is ambitious: she aims to show that “new-style” international courts 
(ICs) are producing a “judicialization of international relations” that is “diminishing gov-
ernment control over how international legal agreements are understood domestically and 
internationally.”2 To accomplish that goal, the book offers a theory of the functioning of 
modern international courts, traces their emergence, maps their empirical terrain, and of-
fers case-study explorations of the effects—both domestic and international—of specific 
IC decisions. New Terrain is a capstone to the major contributions that Alter has made to 
theorizing international courts and evaluating them empirically for more than twenty 
years, in research that has extended from the European Court of Justice to international 
courts in Latin America and Africa. 
In the review that follows, I first explore the book’s theoretical framework, high-
lighting connections to major strands of research on international law and courts and em-
phasizing the decisive stance New Terrain takes toward them. I then turn, in the second 
section, to three central themes in the book, each of which signals directions for comple-
mentary lines of inquiry. The first theme addresses the nature and importance of rule of 
law cultures, which play a crucial role in international courts “altering politics.”3 A second 
theme concerns judicial decision-making in international courts, in particular, how inter-
national judges might (and probably must) take into account domestic political and legal 
contexts. The third theme emphasizes the dynamism of normative systems where new-
style international courts are at work. The final section offers concluding thoughts. 
                                                          
* John A. McCone Chair in International Relations, School of International Relations and Gould School of Law, 
University of Southern California. 
 1. KAREN J. ALTER, THE NEW TERRAIN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: COURTS, POLITICS, RIGHTS (2014). 
 2. Id. at 5. 
 3. Id. at 32-67. 
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I. THEORY 
Alter sets out her theory in chapter 2, “International Courts Altering Politics.” The 
chapter is the single best theoretical piece on international courts that I have encountered. 
Alter stakes out a position as far from that of the international law skeptics as she can make 
it. The international law skeptics are scholars who, importing simplified versions of “real-
ism” from International Relations, argue that international law has no independent effect 
on the behavior of states.4 They contend that states comply with international legal obli-
gations not because they are legal but because compliance either serves state interests or 
is imposed by superior power. The realist view of international courts is that, because in-
ternational law has no autonomous effect, ICs can only be agents of states, molding their 
decisions to conform to the preferences of the most powerful states.5 The contrary view, 
advanced vigorously by Alter and others, is that under certain conditions, international 
courts can be trustees of a normative system rather than servants of states.6 In previous 
work Alter has contributed to theorizing about trustee courts.7 In New Terrain she qualifies 
slightly the earlier work, arguing that ICs are most like trustees when they are empowered 
to enforce legal norms against states themselves.8 
The debate on whether international courts can be anything more than faithful agents 
of states has tended to focus on the European Court of Justice (ECJ); the ECJ is also the 
international court that has been most intensively subjected to empirical analysis for the 
purpose of determining whether its rulings are systematically shaped by member state 
preferences.9 The ECJ is a natural focal point for such research because it is widely seen 
as having exercised a broadly independent role in shaping EU law and policy and, in fact, 
as having “constitutionalized” the EU regime.10 A substantial body of empirical work has 
shown that the ECJ routinely rules in ways that the member states oppose and would not 
have approved through normal legislative mechanisms.11 
                                                          
 4. JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005). Goldsmith and 
Posner are probably the most cited exponents of this view, which has, of course, been vigorously contested by 
other scholars. The literature on both sides of the debate is too extensive to be cited or adequately discussed in 
this review. 
 5. Geoffrey Garrett et al., The European Court of Justice, National Governments, and Legal Integration in 
the European Union, 52 INT’L ORG. 149 (1998); Geoffrey Garrett & Barry R. Weingast, Ideas, Interests, and 
Institutions: Constructing the European Community’s Internal Market, in IDEAS AND FOREIGN POLICY: BELIEFS, 
INSTITUTIONS, AND POLITICAL CHANGE 173 (Judith Goldstein & Robert O. Keohane eds., 1993). 
 6. Alec Stone Sweet & Thomas L. Brunell, Trustee Courts and the Judicialization of International Regimes: 
The Politics of Majoritarian Activism in the European Convention on Human Rights, the European Union, and 
the World Trade Organization, 1 J.L. & CTS. 61 (2013). 
 7. Karen J. Alter, Agents or Trustees? International Courts in Their Political Context, 14 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 
33 (2008). 
 8. ALTER, supra note 1, at 9 n.8. Alter describes ICs that can apply international rules to states as acting in 
“self-binding judicial roles.” “Self-binding” refers to situations in which ICs apply rules that are meant to con-
strain states themselves. “Other-binding” refers to situations in which ICs extend state power by enforcing legal 
norms against other states, international organizations, or non-state actors. 
 9. Stone Sweet & Brunell, supra note 6, at 72 (“To date, the EU is the only international regime on which 
scholars have designed systematic research to assess whether judicial outcomes are constrained by the threats of 
noncompliance and override.”). 
 10. Eric Stein, Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of a Transnational Constitution, 75 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (1981); 
Joseph H. H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403 (1991); J. H. H. WEILER, THE 
CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE (1999); ALEC STONE SWEET, THE JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE (2004). 
 11. See generally Karen J. Alter, Who Are the “Masters of the Treaty”?: European Governments and the 
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In the most recent round of this debate, Carrubba, Gabel, and Hankla claim to offer 
quantitative evidence supporting the proposition that the EU member-state governments 
constrain the ECJ’s decision-making by: (1) collectively threatening to override its judg-
ments, and (2) individually threatening non-compliance with those decisions.12 Both 
claims have been comprehensively refuted.13 Carrubba, Gabel, and Hankla mistakenly as-
sumed that the ECJ decisions in their dataset of 3,176 legal issues were all subject to over-
ride by a qualified majority vote of the member states, which would make it easier for 
states to reverse them. In fact, more than ninety percent of the legal issues they include in 
the analysis could only be overridden by unanimity, which makes the threat of override 
non-credible.14 Carrubba, Gabel, and Hankla provided no data on member-state threats of 
non-compliance and offered no test of their second proposition.15 
In fact, the European Commission’s position, which will virtually always support 
the expansion and application of EU law, is more likely to predict the ECJ’s decisions than 
are the weighted member-state government positions, in cases where the defendant is a 
member state.16 Stone Sweet and Brunell show that in non-compliance cases (Article 258 
enforcement proceedings), though the member states rarely (3.2 percent of cases) register 
a net weighted position supporting the Commission, the ECJ rules against the defendant 
state more than 90 percent of the time.17 Non-compliance, in other words, triggers ECJ 
action; it does not constrain it. In preliminary reference cases (under Article 267, in which 
national courts refer a question to the ECJ for the interpretation of EU law), when the 
Commission and the member states (collectively) take opposite sides, the ECJ favors the 
Commission position more than two-thirds of the time.18 
Alter has been a protagonist in the debates on the ECJ and takes the question of the 
Court’s independence as settled.19 On the broader question of whether international courts 
                                                          
European Court of Justice, 52 INT’L ORG. 121 (1998); Anne-Marie Burley & Walter Mattli, Europe Before the 
Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration, 47 INT’L ORG. 41 (1993); RACHEL CICHOWSKI, THE EUROPEAN 
COURT AND CIVIL SOCIETY: LITIGATION, MOBILIZATION, AND GOVERNANCE (2007); Margaret McCown, The 
European Parliament before the bench: ECJ precedent and EP litigation strategies, 10 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 974 
(2003); Stacy A. Nyikos, The Preliminary Reference Process: National Court Implementation, Changing Op-
portunity Structures and Litigant Desistment, 4 EUR. UNION POL. 397 (2003); MARK A. POLLACK, THE ENGINES 
OF INTEGRATION: DELEGATION, AGENCY, AND AGENCY SETTING IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (2003); STONE 
SWEET, supra note 6; Jonas Tallberg, Delegation to Supranational Institutions: Why, How, and with What Con-
sequences?, 25 W. EUR. POL. 23 (2002). 
 12. Clifford J. Carrubba et al., Judicial Behavior under Political Constraints: Evidence from the European 
Court of Justice, 102 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 439 (2008). 
 13. Alec Stone Sweet & Thomas Brunell, The European Court of Justice, State Noncompliance, and the 
Politics of Override, 106 AM. POLI. SCI. REV. 204 (2012); Stone Sweet & Brunell, supra note 6. 
 14. Stone Sweet & Brunell, supra note 13, at 206-08. 
 15. Instead of testing their hypothesis that the threat of non-compliance constrains ECJ decisions, Carrubba, 
Gabel, and Hankla test a very different proposition, namely, that “[t]he more opposition a litigant government 
has from other MSGs [member-state governments], the more likely the court is to rule against that litigant gov-
ernment;” Carrubba et al., supra note 12. This allows them to count as evidence in their favor any case in which 
the balance of weighted member-state observations favors a ruling against the defendant state, even if only one 
state submits an observation and even if that state is a small one like Luxembourg. Their analysis therefore does 
not test the claim that the threat of non-compliance by a state that is subject to an unfavorable ECJ decision 
constrains the Court. 
 16. Stone Sweet & Brunell, supra note 13. 
 17. Stone Sweet & Brunell, supra note 6, at 73. 
 18. Id. at 75. 
 19. Alter, supra note 11; KAREN J. ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF EUROPEAN LAW: THE 
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in general are simple agents of states or whether they can have an autonomous impact on 
politics and policies, she takes the latter view as her point of departure: “[I]t is more plau-
sible that we accept the possibility that ICs can rule against the preferences of governments 
and then ask how ICs get governments to then change their behavior.”20 Alter does not 
claim that ICs are wholly independent of state preferences, nor that state compliance with 
IC judgments is non-problematic. Rather, she presents a theory of the conditions under 
which international courts can bring about shifts in state behavior, “in the direction of 
greater respect for international law,”21 that is, how ICs can alter international politics. 
The problem with existing accounts of the relationship between international courts 
and national governments is not that they are all wrong, but that they are all right—some 
of the time. New Terrain identifies three existing categories of models. ICs help states to 
resolve disputes by identifying focal points that are consistent with the preferences of both 
states (the interstate arbiter model). By judging that certain acts fall outside the bounds of 
legality, ICs can also generate behavior that is consistent with international law through 
decisions that motivate other states to impose sanctions-based or reputational costs on the 
offending state (the multilateral adjudication model). Finally, IC decisions can mobilize 
and empower both domestic and transnational actors who can bring pressure to bear on 
governments to comply with the IC ruling (the transnational politics model). Alter’s goal 
is to bring the three existing classes of models together into one unifying framework (she, 
correctly in my view, does not label it a theory). The unifying framework is a set of inter-
locking propositions about how legality, and actors that value legality, can move states 
toward compliance with IC decisions.22 
At the center of Alter’s argument are “compliance constituencies.” Compliance con-
stituencies include actors—primarily state officials—who have the authority to “choose 
compliance” with international law and with specific IC decisions, as well as broader 
groups of non-state actors who “support adherence to a specific international law” and 
provide political backing to officials who pursue it.23 International courts influence gov-
ernments through alliances with domestic and international compliance constituencies. 
Through their decisions, ICs can empower “those actors who have international law on 
their side, increasing their out of court political leverage. ICs then alter political outcomes 
by giving symbolic, legal, and political resources to compliance constituencies.”24 The 
move to see international courts’ primary channel of influence as operating through a va-
riety of transnational and domestic allies parallels important lines of research on interna-
tional norms and law. A durable insight in research on the effects of international human 
rights norms, for example, is that norm entrepreneurs and activists can bring political pres-
sure on rights-abusing governments by mobilizing both transnational and domestic ac-
tors.25 Human rights treaties exert their most powerful effects through domestic channels, 
                                                          
MAKING OF AN INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW IN EUROPE (2001). 
 20. ALTER, supra note 1, at 43. 
 21. Id. at 52. 
 22. Id. at 42-52. 
 23. Id. at 53. 
 24. Id. at 19. 
 25. Alison Brysk, From Above and Below: Social Movements, the International System and Human Rights 
4
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 51 [2015], Iss. 2, Art. 21
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol51/iss2/21
DOCUMENT 1 (DO NOT DELETE) 3/7/2016  11:15 PM 
2016] A NEW AGE OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS? 475 
giving domestic actors a source of political leverage (pressure politics) as well as the po-
tential for legal recourse in domestic courts (judicial politics).26 
By focusing on alliances between ICs and various domestic and transnational actors, 
Alter shifts the compliance focus away from governments, who are the key actors in real-
ist-inspired accounts. International courts, then, are not constrained to be simple agents of 
states because governments are not the only effective players when it comes to compliance 
with IC decisions. Domestic judges, administrators, military officers, and legislators can 
all, in some circumstances, take action to comply with IC judgments. One implication, of 
course, is that as international judges craft their rulings they must think about a variety of 
potential compliance constituencies beyond just national executives. I return later to two 
issues raised by compliance constituencies: the motivations of compliance constituencies, 
and the links between international courts and domestic politico-legal contexts. 
A second key theoretical anchor for New Terrain is Alter’s temporal framework for 
the international litigation process. Once a state violates an international rule or obligation, 
international courts exercise their influence in three partially overlapping periods or stages. 
The stages are not meant to represent a strict linear chronology but are analytical constructs 
that illuminate important mechanisms and processes. Time 1 is the pre-litigation stage, in 
which most of the action takes place domestically. Both domestic actors (courts, legisla-
tures, prosecutors) and international legal actors bring pressure to bear on national political 
actors who have the authority to choose compliance with international law. The key is that 
this takes place “in the shadow of an IC,” as litigation looms should the state not rectify 
its violation of an international obligation.27 In Time 2, the various actors try to persuade 
an international court to rule in their favor. If the IC rules against the state, compliance 
constituencies use “leverage strategies” in Time 3 to pressure the state to comply with the 
IC’s decision. The mechanisms highlighted in the three existing models of compliance 
with international courts can all operate within Alter’s three-stage framework. 
Alter makes the bold claim that “new-style” ICs can shift international relations 
“away from state control in both domestic and international realms.”28 It is the “new-style” 
qualifier that requires emphasis. “Old-style” international courts were designed simply to 
help states resolve disputes. Old-style ICs, like the International Court of Justice, continue 
to function in this mode, and international law skeptics29 assume that international courts 
in general are limited to that role. New-style ICs can take on additional roles (administra-
tive review, enforcement, and constitutional review in Alter’s typology). These modern 
ICs are producing a “judicialization of international relations and diminishing government 
control over how international legal agreements are understood domestically and interna-
tionally.”30 
                                                          
in Argentina, 26 COMP. POL. STUD. 259 (1993); MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND 
BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998). 
 26. BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS 
(2009). 
 27. ALTER, supra note 1, at 55. 
 28. Id. at 19. 
 29. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 4; Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in Interna-
tional Tribunals, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 3 (2005). 
 30. ALTER, supra note 1, at 5. 
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What is new about the “new-style ICs”? Two main features distinguish them: (1) 
they tend to have compulsory jurisdiction, and (2) they allow non-state actors (interna-
tional commissions or prosecutors, or private individuals) to trigger litigation.31 Old-style 
courts see international law essentially as contracts between states.32 New-style courts im-
ply a “rule of law conceptualization of the meaning of international law” in which “gov-
ernments are not above the law” and law creates “obligations regardless of what other 
states do.”33 The book focuses on twenty-four international courts, selected because they 
are both permanent and operational.34 Excluded are quasi-judicial bodies, like the Interna-
tional Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), whose panels are ad hoc 
and therefore not permanent, and courts that exist on paper but are non-functioning (like 
the dispute settlement body of the Organization of Arab Oil Exporting States). Of the 
twenty-four ICs, twenty-three have at least some new-style features; the sole exception is 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ).35 Only six of the twenty-four courts existed before 
1989, and of the 37,236 binding judgments issued by the twenty-four courts in contentious 
cases, ninety-one percent came after the fall of the Berlin Wall.36 
Europe (in the form of the ECJ and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)) 
is, as Alter notes, exceptional. The ECJ and the ECtHR have accounted for 33,451, or 
90%, of all judgments produced by the twenty-four ICs.37 But Alter also notes that the 
European courts started out slowly and that, if compared from the year of their first 
judgment, the more recent new-style ICs have been about as active as the two European 
courts in a similar phase of their development.38 Still, it seems unlikely that other ICs will 
experience the same conditions that generated the rapid expansion of judicial activity in 
the ECJ and the ECtHR: the simultaneous and mutually reinforcing growth in legislation, 
in cases filed, and in expansive judicial decisions, all in the context of strong rule-of-law 
cultures. 
 
II. EXPLORING THE NEW TERRAIN 
 
International lawyers and social scientists who follow one or a few international 
courts may not need to be persuaded that ICs created in recent decades have generated 
important jurisprudence through decisions that have substantive effects. But New Terrain 
will be useful even for that audience, as Alter presents the broader picture of ICs taken as 
a whole. The book offers a tour of the empirical territory of modern ICs and an analytical 
framework for assessing their effects on international and domestic law and politics. New 
                                                          
 31. Id.; see also Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational 
Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273 (1997). 
 32. ALTER, supra note 1, at 6. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 70. These courts meet additional criteria included in the definition of international courts employed 
by the Project on International Courts and Tribunals (PICT). For more information on PICT, please visit 
http://www.pict-pcti.org/matrix/Matrix-main.html. 
 35. Id. at 84 fig.3.2. 
 36. Id. at 4, 73-75 fig.3.1. 
 37. ALTER, supra note 1, at 72-73 fig.3.1. 
 38. Id. at 106-07 figs.3.14 & 3.15. 
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Terrain opens multiple questions and provides points of departure for finding ways to an-
swer them. This section explores some of those questions and raises further ones, focusing 
on cultures of obedience to international law, judicial decision-making, and the dynamism 
of judicialized systems. 
A. The Commitment to Law and Cultures of Obedience 
Underlying Alter’s framework is an assumption, or perhaps a commitment to the 
idea, that at least some actors value legality in itself. It is a crucial assumption, and one 
that appears almost every time Alter discusses compliance constituencies. It is also an 
assumption that starkly separates Alter from the international law skeptics, who assume 
that states decide whether to comply with international law and IC judgments purely on 
the basis of instrumental calculations of material payoffs. To take a prominent example, 
Goldsmith and Posner explicitly assume that (1) rules and institutions do not shape inter-
ests and (2) rule-following cannot be a state interest.39 
In contrast, much of the distinctiveness of Alter’s account stems from the idea that 
at least some actors value legality and adherence to law for their own sakes. Alter recog-
nizes that actors are driven by both instrumental and normative motivations.40 “Some 
[compliance] supporters will be self-interested, seeking rulings that benefit themselves and 
their clients.”41 Others support compliance with IC rulings because they “benefit from the 
international legal system overall.”42 Still other compliance constituencies favor conform-
ance with IC judgments even when they “do not have a dog in the fight,” because they 
“see themselves as rule of law actors.”43 As Alter argues, “[s]upport for the rule of law . . . 
bring[s] civil society groups and countries that are substantively self-interested together 
with individuals, groups, and foreign governments that care about correct legal interpreta-
tion and the rule of law more generally.”44  
New Terrain does not explore the basis for or the logic of the second category of 
motivation—the benefits of the international system of rules—and, in fact, it remains 
largely undeveloped in scholarship on international law compliance. The idea is that spe-
cific “games” of international relations are embedded in higher-order or “meta” games, 
which are about the system of rules itself. Violating the rules in the lower-level game (to 
gain a temporary trade advantage, for example) could have an economic or political payoff 
in the short-term, but potentially at some cost in the meta-game if violations undermine 
the system of rules and the predictability that they bring. Actors may therefore be in a 
situation of optimizing: How much selfish breaking of the rules in the lower-level game is 
possible without destabilizing the framework of rules itself? And do actors think about 
their interests at both levels? Theoretical development could help explore answers to such 
questions. 
                                                          
  39. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 4, at ch. 1. 
 40. ALTER, supra note 1, at 64. 
 41. Id. at 53. 
 42. Id. at 22. 
  43. Id. at 53. 
 44. Id. 
7
Sandholtz: A New Age of International Courts
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2015
DOCUMENT 1 (DO NOT DELETE) 3/7/2016  11:15 PM 
478 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:471 
The third motivation—that some actors value legality and the rule of law itself—
seems plausible. Many readers will want to accept it. But the book does not attempt to 
justify the assumption that such a motivation is real nor examine its foundations. Research 
has addressed the underlying psychology of compliance with law,45 and the late Thomas 
Franck argued that international law created through fair and accepted processes exerts a 
compliance pull.46 But little work that I am aware of has focused directly on the extent to 
which people (in governments, courts, NGOs, or publics) in fact view international legality 
as a sufficient motive or justification for action. Yet the assumption is crucial to Alter’s 
arguments. Alter posits that “some compliance supporters are primarily motivated by their 
normative commitment to the rule of law and a belief that the IC ruling correctly applies 
the law.”47 International courts can empower these actors, providing them with legal jus-
tifications for choosing policies that conform to IC decisions. IC judgments carry a “pre-
sumed authority” that can help compliance advocates “delegitimize” positions that are 
contrary to the IC’s interpretation.48 
The commitment to legality and the rule of law is especially vital when international 
courts exercise constitutional review, which consists of “the judicial authority to invalidate 
laws and government acts on the basis of a conflict with higher order legal obligations.”49 
In the new terrain of international law, those higher order legal obligations are to be found 
in, for example, the EU treaties with respect to the ECJ, the American Convention on 
Human Rights for the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), and the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) within the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
Dispute Settlement System. Effective constitutional review by international courts re-
quires the existence of “[a] culture of constitutional obedience,” which means “a political 
culture in which any legislative text or government action found to violate higher order 
law becomes inherently illegitimate.”50 Scholars have studied the development of domes-
tic constitutional courts, constitutional review, and cultures of constitutional obedience.51 
However, cultures of constitutional obedience to international law may be, as Alter notes, 
something quite different.52 Scholars have made progress in analyzing when and how do-
mestic courts make use of international law and IC decisions,53 but Alter makes a different 
argument: that broader judicial cultures of adherence to international law can empower 
                                                          
 45. See, e.g., Jonathan Jackson et al., Why Do People Comply with the Law?: Legitimacy and the Influence 
of Legal Institutions, 52 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 1051 (2012); TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 
(2006). 
 46. THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990). 
 47. ALTER, supra note 1, at 53. 
 48. Id. at 22. 
 49. Id. at 282 (citing ALEC STONE SWEET, GOVERNING WITH JUDGES: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN EUROPE 
21 (2000)). 
 50. Id. at 290. 
 51. Id. at 291-92. See also id. at 291 nn.14-17, 292 n.18 (citing some of the relevant research). 
 52. ALTER, supra note 1, at 292. 
 53. See, e.g., André Nollkaemper, Internationally Wrongful Acts in Domestic Courts, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 760 
(2007); ANDRÉ NOLLKAEMPER, NATIONAL COURTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW (2011); DAVID 
SLOSS, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN TREATY ENFORCEMENT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (2009); Melissa 
A. Waters, Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role of Transnational Judicial Dialogue in Creating and Enforc-
ing International Law, 93 GEO. L.J. 487 (2005); Melissa A. Waters, Creeping Monism: The Judicial Trend 
Toward Interpretive Incorporation of Human Rights Treaties, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 628 (2007). 
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international courts. The book does not explain how to identify cultures of adherence to 
international law or assess their strength. It does, however, provide some initial signposts 
for possible directions of such work, noting that national judges are probably crucial to 
whether domestic cultures of obedience to international law develop.54 The idea of domes-
tic cultures of adherence to international law is a richly intriguing one that begs for research 
to identify their preconditions, to assess their variation across countries, and to document 
their effects on law and policy.55 
B. Judicial Decision-Making in International Courts 
New Terrain depicts international courts affecting domestic law and policy and shift-
ing international relations. The judges who sit on new-style international courts, then, play 
a pivotal and increasingly important role. Yet how international judges perform that role 
and how they reach decisions, when they are both partially independent but also legally 
and politically constrained, remain largely unknown. Though theories of judicial decision-
making are quite developed in the U.S. context (especially for the Supreme Court) and are 
beginning to emerge in other national and comparative settings,56 we know little about 
judicial decision-making in international courts.57 
Alter does not offer a theory of international judicial decision-making, but her argu-
ments reveal a set of important assumptions. Elsewhere she has argued that the multilateral 
nature of the appointment process for judges on international courts means that interna-
tional judges are probably more insulated from appointment or confirmation politics than 
are domestic judges.58 The assumption that international judges are at least partially inde-
pendent of national governments underlies the entire argument of New Terrain. Delegation 
to an IC creates “an independent outside actor with the legal authority to say what inter-
                                                          
 54. ALTER, supra note 1, at 292-94. 
 55. Analyzing cultures of adherence raises tricky empirical challenges. For instance, it is crucial to devise 
indicators of the existence of a culture of adherence that are independent of the IC’s decision-making. Alter 
argues that an IC will exercise restraint if it perceives that a domestic culture of international law obedience is 
lacking, but then IC restraint cannot serve as evidence of the absence of such a culture. For a useful exploration 
of the multiple ways in which international law and international courts interact with national law and institutions, 
see Gregory Shaffer, How the WTO Shapes Regulatory Governance, 9 REGUL. GOV. 1 (2015). 
 56. See, e.g., Ezequiel González Ocantos, Persuade Them or Oust Them: Crafting Judicial Change and 
Transitional Justice in Argentina, 46 COMP. POL. 479 (2014); Ezequiel González Ocantos, The Collapse of 
Impunity Regimes in Latin America: Legal Cultures, Strategic Litigation and Judicial Behavior (July 2012) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Notre Dame); GRETCHEN HELMKE & JULIO RÍOS-FIGUEROA, 
COURTS IN LATIN AMERICA (2011); LISA HILBINK, JUDGES BEYOND POLITICS IN DEMOCRACY AND 
DICTATORSHIP: LESSONS FROM CHILE (2007); Alexandra Huneeus, Judging from a Guilty Conscience: The Chil-
ean Judiciary’s Human Rights Turn, 35 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY (2010); DIANA KAPISZEWSKI, HIGH COURTS AND 
ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE IN ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL (2012); Georg Vanberg, Establishing Judicial Independ-
ence in West Germany: The Impact of Opinion Leadership and the Separation of Powers, 32 COMP. POL. 333 
(2000). 
 57. Empirical research on judicial behavior in international courts is sparse. In one of the few existing studies, 
Voeten shows that judges on the European Court of Human Rights tend to favor their home countries, but that 
the proportion of cases in which a home-country bias might affect the outcome is extremely small. See Erik 
Voeten, The Impartiality of International Judges: Evidence from the European Court of Human Rights, 102 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 417 (2008). 
 58. Karen J. Alter, Delegation to International Courts and the Limits of Recontracting Power, in 
DELEGATION AND AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 312 (Darren G. Hawkins et al. eds., 2006). 
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national law means” and whose “legal interpretations are presumed to be more independ-
ent and disinterested compared to self-serving arguments litigating states put forward.”59 
ICs are legal actors that reside “outside of the control of litigating states.”60 
A second key assumption is that, in general, judges on international courts will act 
as trustees of a legal regime and seek to apply its norms. This means that “international 
judging” is guided in part by “legal facts,” namely, “what the law requires.”61 Thus “ICs 
enforcing international economic rules will tend to promote market openness. ICs enforc-
ing human rights rules will tend to promote a human rights agenda. International war 
crimes tribunals will tend to condemn state practices that harm noncombatants.”62 Alter 
assumes that judges on international courts possess both the degree of independence and 
the underlying judicial preference to uphold international legal rules and apply them even, 
at times, when doing so contradicts the preferences of important states.63 These are crucial 
assumptions that call for empirical exploration. 
At the same time, Alter recognizes that “[b]eing a trustee [of international legal 
norms] does not mean that international judges are entirely neutral or fully independent 
actors.”64 They are both “legally and politically constrained.”65 Where Alter diverges from 
the international law skeptics and the IR realists is that she does not see the source of 
political constraints on ICs as emanating solely from states.66 Rather, ICs are constrained 
(or enabled) by the absence (or presence) of domestic compliance constituencies (see the 
discussion above).67 Governments, or more narrowly, national executives, are not the only 
potentially important constituency.68 The upshot is that, though ICs (like all courts) lack 
overt means to compel states to comply with their rulings, they are not “beholden to the 
interests and preferences of governments.”69 The range of IC interlocutors is much 
broader. ICs can use “their institutional position to aid actors inside and outside of states 
that share the objectives inscribed into the law.”70 International courts can therefore “work 
with domestic and transnational interlocutors to either orchestrate compliance or construct 
counter-pressures that alter the political balance in favor of policies that better cohere with 
international legal obligations.”71 In other words, the primary constraints on ICs are the 
availability of compliance constituencies and the ability of the court to engage or empower 
those actors.72 
International courts must consequently take into account the degree to which their 
interpretations of the law are likely to resonate with and lend political or legal support to 
                                                          
 59. ALTER, supra note 1, at 9. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 23. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. ALTER, supra note 1, at 9. 
 65. Id. at 8. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 19. 
 68. Id. at 18. 
 69. ALTER, supra note 1, at 19. 
 70. Id. at 20. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 18-20. 
10
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 51 [2015], Iss. 2, Art. 21
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol51/iss2/21
DOCUMENT 1 (DO NOT DELETE) 3/7/2016  11:15 PM 
2016] A NEW AGE OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS? 481 
(primarily) domestic pro-compliance actors.73 As Alter puts it, “international judges 
should, and probably do, consider whether or not there is legal and political support for 
the interpretations they advocate.”74 The point is such a crucial one that it calls for further 
theoretical and empirical development—work that social science and law scholars should 
be eager to take up. Alter offers the intriguing speculation, for instance, that the adjustment 
by international judges “to the realities of their environments” may be most visible in the 
remedies they order, where judges might enjoy greater flexibility.75 The case studies in the 
second half of the book offer examples of remedies that vary in the difficulty of domestic 
implementation. At one end, the Andean Tribunal of Justice ordered no remedies in the 
Peru Exemptions Case, finding that the violation had already been corrected.76 In the 
Modern-Day Slavery Case, Hadijatou Mani v. Niger, the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) Court of Justice ordered compensation for the victim but did 
not rule on whether Niger’s laws violated international rules, making compliance more 
likely.77 At the other extreme, the IACtHR ordered Nicaragua to adopt substantial legal 
and institutional changes regarding indigenous communal land rights in Mayagno (Sumo) 
Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua.78 
Alter’s insight on ICs’ potential flexibility with remedies flags the need for much 
greater understanding of judicial decision-making in international courts.79 How do inter-
national judges weigh the multiple legal and political considerations that arise in the dis-
putes that come before them? In particular, how do IC judges balance two objectives that 
are often in fundamental tension: one, advancing the international rule of law, and two, 
garnering support for and compliance with their judgments? 
Research has begun to explore that key question. For instance, Stone Sweet and Bru-
nell analyze how international courts expand the reach of international legal norms while 
navigating the heterogeneous preferences of member states.80 They argue that international 
trustee courts employ a strategy of “majoritarian activism.”81 The heart of the strategy is 
that the court assesses the practice of the states involved in the regime, to gauge the degree 
of state consensus on the rule in dispute, or even on a more expansive interpretation of it.82 
The practice of a majority of states is a fact relevant to the resolution of the case.83 The 
court’s decisions will then approximate outcomes that the states might adopt “under ma-
joritarian, but not unanimity, decision rules.”84 When a majority of states has enacted a 
                                                          
 73. Id. at 66. 
 74. ALTER, supra note 1, at 66 
 75. Id. at 60. 
 76. Id. at 295-98. 
 77. Id. at 260-67; Mme Hadijatou Mani Koraou v. The Republic of Niger, (2008) AHRLR 182 (ECOWAS 
2008), available at http://www.chr.up.ac.za/index.php/browse-by-subject/379-niger-koraou-v-niger-2008-ahrlr-
ecowas-2008.html. 
 78. ALTER, supra note 1, at 315-19; The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty, v. Nicaragua, Judgment of 
Aug. 31, 2001, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (Ser. C) No. 79 (2001). 
 79. ALTER, supra note 1, at 346, 348. 
 80. Stone Sweet & Brunell, supra note 6, at 61. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 63-64. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 64. 
11
Sandholtz: A New Age of International Courts
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2015
DOCUMENT 1 (DO NOT DELETE) 3/7/2016  11:15 PM 
482 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:471 
more expansive interpretation of a norm in their domestic policies and practices, the court 
can adopt that interpretation in its decision, thereby applying it to all states within their 
jurisdiction, even the “laggard[s].”85 For instance, the ECtHR has expanded rights protec-
tions for homosexuals through a strategy of majoritarian activism.86 The strategy allows 
the court to expand the reach of international legal norms while at the same time ensuring 
a majority compliance coalition of states.87 Sandholtz and Rangel Padilla offer evidence 
that the Inter-American Human Rights System (comprised of a commission and a court) 
has modulated both the timing and the scope of its fourteen decisions on national amnesty 
laws in light of domestic politico-legal conditions.88 The IACtHR has thereby been able to 
construct an interpretation of the American Convention on Human Rights that prohibits 
amnesties, but it has done so in a way that increased the likelihood that its rulings would 
find (in Alter’s terms) domestic compliance constituencies.  
On judicial decision-making in international courts, New Terrain thus raises crucial 
questions and indicates important avenues to be pursued. 
C.  The Dynamics of Law in International Courts 
New Terrain forcefully makes the case that international law is inherently dynamic,89 
and that international courts are engines of legal norm change, with consequences for state 
behavior and world politics.90 The contrast here is with (mainly) political science ap-
proaches to international law and international legal institutions, in which a sense of the 
dynamism of law and judicialized politics is almost entirely missing.91 For example, in the 
“legalization” approach in International Relations, the focus is on the choices and tradeoffs 
states make in creating international legal rules and institutions.92 There is no systematic 
attention to how legal norms evolve through disputes and dispute resolution.93 The “ra-
tional design of international institutions” approach suffers from the same limitation.94 It 
offers sophisticated propositions about the tradeoffs states make in setting up institutions 
to enforce international agreements95 but has almost nothing to say about what happens 
                                                          
 85. Stone Sweet & Brunell, supra note 6, at 81. 
 86. Id. at 79-80. 
 87. Id. at 86 
 88. ALTER, supra note 1, at 19; see also Wayne Sandholtz & Mariana Rangel Padilla, Law and Politics in a 
Trustee Court: Amnesty Laws and the Inter-American System (2015) (Workshop paper) (on file with the UCLA 
Department of Polical Science). 
 89. On the dynamics of international law, see Alec Stone Sweet, Judicialization and the Construction of 
Governance, 32 COMP. POL. STUD. (1999); WAYNE SANDHOLTZ, PROHIBITING PLUNDER: HOW NORMS CHANGE 
(2007); WAYNE SANDHOLTZ & KENDALL W. STILES, INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND CYCLES OF CHANGE (2009); 
Terence C. Halliday, Recursivity of Global Normmaking: A Sociolegal Agenda, 5 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 
(2009); Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Legal Orders, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL 
ORDERS (Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer eds., 2015). 
 90. ALTER, supra note 1, at 44. 
 91. See generally JUDITH L. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., LEGALIZATION AND WORLD POLITICS (2001). 
 92. Id. at 386.  
 93. See generally Barbara Koremenos et al., The Rational Design of International Institutions, 55 INT’L ORG. 
761, 762 (2001). 
 94. Id. at 761. 
 95. Id. at 771. 
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once such bodies are adjudicating claims and interpreting rules. The inattention to the dy-
namics of legal and judicial institutions is traceable to the baseline position for many In-
ternational Relations scholars that international courts have no independent effect on con-
duct or outcomes.96 Indeed, the field of International Relations has, for the most part, 
ignored international jurisprudence. Alter offers an important corrective: “[T]he decisions 
of governments to create ICs . . . are important, but legal practice shapes what institutions 
become.”97 
Alter contends that “[d]elegation to ICs . . . promotes political change in the direc-
tion indicated by the law”—provided that the necessary compliance constituencies exist.98 
The process is dynamic because ICs can “interpret existing laws in unexpected ways,” and 
those interpretations can empower various domestic and transnational actors who will 
pressure governments to comply with IC decisions.99 Alter’s argument powerfully com-
plements the work that Stone Sweet and others have done over many years to integrate 
jurisprudential and political analyses and to show empirically how judicial decisions shift 
the calculations, and hence the choices, of social and political actors.100 The more judicial-
ization proceeds, the more motivated actors will be to act in ways that are defensible in 
light of the legal interpretations announced by the court, and the more their decisions will 
be influenced by the shadow of the court.101 The more courts are seen as authoritative 
interpreters of norms, the more violations of the rules will trigger litigation, and the more 
courts will shape (or reshape) the rules.102 
In New Terrain, Alter makes a compelling argument that these dynamics are emerg-
ing around more international courts than most readers will have imagined.103 She illus-
trates her claims in the second half of the book with a series of case studies.104 The case 
studies analyze the jurisprudence of diverse international courts resolving diverse kinds of 
claims, and examine their effects on political and policy outcomes.105 The point of these 
chapters is not to test a theory but to establish the plausibility of the broader argument that 
                                                          
 96. Most International Law (IL) scholarship, with the exception of IL “realists” and skeptics, assumes the 
opposite. Constructivist approaches in IR tend to take international courts seriously. 
 97. ALTER, supra note 1, at 111. 
 98. Id. at 27; see Part II.A supra. The crucial role played by compliance constituencies in Alter’s framework 
underscores the necessity, discussed above, of identifying the factors that produce or foster cultures of interna-
tional law obedience. 
 99. ALTER, supra note 1, at 27. 
 100. Alec Stone Sweet, Judicialization and the Construction of Governance, 32 COMP. POL. STUD. 137 (1999); 
ALEC STONE SWEET, THE JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE (2004); Alec Stone Sweet, Path Dependence, 
Precedent, and Judicial Power, in ON LAW, POLITICS, AND JUDICIALIZATION (Martin Shapiro & Alec Stone 
Sweet eds., 2002); Burley & Mattli, Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration, 47 INT’L 
ORG. 41 (1993); Wayne Sandholtz, The Emergence of a Supranational Telecommunications Regime, in 
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND SUPRANATIONAL GOVERNANCE ch. 5 (Wayne Sandholtz & Alec Stone Sweet 
eds., 1998); Wayne Sandholtz & Alec Stone Sweet, Law, Politics, and International Governance, in THE 
POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 238-71 (Christian Reus-Smit ed., 2004); Jonas Tallberg, Paths to 
Compliance: Enforcement, Management, and the European Union, 56 INT’L ORG. 609 (2002). 
 101. ALTER, supra note 1, at 5. 
 102. Id. at 7.  
 103. Id. at 3-4. 
 104. Id. at 260-67. 
 105. Id. 
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international courts are altering domestic and international politics.106 Readers’ prior be-
liefs about international courts will probably shape how they judge the cumulative effect 
of the case studies. 
Readers may be less convinced that the framing of the case studies in terms of four 
judicial roles (dispute resolution, administrative review, enforcement, and constitutional 
review), or indeed the role typology itself, is crucial to the argument. Of the twenty-four 
courts included in the book, only six perform just one of the four roles. Of those six, three 
are international criminal tribunals (the ICTY, the ICTR, and the ICC), which necessarily 
have narrowly specified jurisdiction. Eight courts (one-third of the total) perform all four 
judicial roles. Alter notes frequently that the roles often “morph” into one another.107 The 
real work seems to be done by the distinction between “other-binding” and “self-binding” 
functions, which do not map directly onto the four judicial roles. 
III. CONCLUSION 
In The New Terrain of International Law, Alter presents a panoramic view of mod-
ern international courts and argues convincingly that they influence domestic and interna-
tional politics as never before.108 She suggests that international law, and international 
courts in particular, have entered a new era.109 Turning back the clock to a time when states 
could choose, case by case, whether or not to be subject to international adjudication “is 
not a realistic or viable option.”110 The new terrain represents a major shift in world poli-
tics, one that is “unlikely to be reversed any time soon.”111 
But does the current state of international courts represent a new era or instead a 
time that will be remembered as a high point in the judicialization of world politics? Skep-
tics might suspect the latter. The two temporary criminal tribunals, the ICTY and the 
ICTR, are winding down. The International Criminal Court has been unable to secure the 
arrest of Omar al-Bashir, even though he has traveled to ICC member states that are sup-
posed to be committed to cooperating with the Court. The ICC had to shut down its case 
against President Uhuru Kenyatta of Kenya and faces widespread resistance, if not hostil-
ity, across much of Africa. International criminal courts, in other words, may not be poised 
to expand their role in world affairs. Among the human rights courts, the ECtHR is coping 
with an overwhelming caseload while the IACtHR continues to be under-resourced and 
modestly utilized. The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights has not really begun 
to function, and there appears to be no prospect of human rights courts emerging in the 
Middle East or Asia. Among international courts with jurisdiction over trade and economic 
issues (the largest single category of ICs), the ECJ has by far the largest caseload (18,511 
binding rulings), followed distantly by the Andean Tribunal of Justice (2,197 rulings) and 
the Common Court of Justice and Arbitration of l’Organisation pour l’Harmonisation en 
                                                          
 106. ALTER, supra note 1, at 4. 
 107. Id. at 38, for example. See also the index entry for “morphing judicial roles.” 
 108. Id. at 3-4. 
 109. Id. at 5-6. 
 110. Id. at 30. 
 111. ALTER, supra note 1, at 31. 
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Afrique du Droite des Affairs (OHADA) (569 rulings).112 
The European courts—the ECJ and the ECtHR—are, by any measure, the most ef-
fective and influential international courts.113 Alter argues that the ECJ and ECtHR design 
templates have been adopted by most other ICs around the world.114 The question is, can 
the non-European courts follow not just the design templates but the trajectory of usage 
and effectiveness of the two European models? Alter provides evidence that many of the 
non-European courts show activity levels that compare favorably with those of the Euro-
pean courts, at similar operational ages.115 
Whether the current development of international courts represents a new era or is a 
temporary golden age will depend on the degree to which the courts serve the needs and 
interests (both material and normative) of those who live under the legal rules those courts 
curate. Whether that happens will depend on three conditions: first, actors—states, firms, 
NGOs, activists, and individual persons—see third-party dispute resolution as an effective 
means to resolve disputes, vindicate rights, and hold authorities accountable; second, in-
ternational courts effectively meet litigants’ needs; and third, compliance constituencies 
embedded in cultures of adherence to international law keep the pressure on governments 
to comply with IC rulings.116 The three conditions are mutually reinforcing. If they develop 
together, judicialization will proceed.117 Alter makes the bet that they will. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 112. Id. at 104. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 90. 
 115. Id. at 106-07. 
 116. See generally ALTER, supra note 1, at 20. 
 117. Id. at 4-5. 
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